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Income inequality in Europe and the US: 
a partisan issue?
Sotiris Zartaloudis, Hellenic Observatory, European Institute
London School of Economics and Political Science
Εισοδηματικές ανισότητες στην Ευρώπη και τις 
ΗΠΑ. Ένα πολιτικό-ιδεολογικό ζήτημα?
Σωτήρης Ζαρταλούδης, Ελληνικό Παρατηρητήριο, Ευρωπαϊκό Ινστιτούτο, 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
ΠΕΡIΛΗΨΗ
Αυτό το άρθρο εξετάζει τα επίπεδα, τάσεις και αιτίες της 
εισοδηματικής ανισότητας στην Ευρώπη και τις ΗΠΑ. 
Από την μία πλευρά, διαπιστώνεται ότι αν και η ανισό-
τητα του καθαρού εισοδήματος (εισόδημα αγοράς) έχει 
γενικά αυξηθεί, αυτό συνέβει περισσότερο σε ορισμέ-
νες χώρες και λιγότερο σε άλλες. Από την άλλη πλευρά, 
η ανισότητα διαθέσιμου εισοδήματος έχει μια αινιγματι-
κή ιδιόρρυθμη εξέλιξη. Η εν λόγω ανισότητα είναι υψη-
λότερη στις ΗΠΑ από τον ευρωπαϊκό μέσο όρο, ενώ 
στην Ευρώπη υπάρχουν τρεις ομάδες χωρών: οι χώρες 
της Μεσογείου και της Κεντρικής και Ανατολικής Ευρώ-
πης (ΚΑΕ), έχουν την υψηλότερη ανισότητα διαθέσιμου 
εισοδήματος -με το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο να είναι η μόνη 
πλούσια χώρα της ΕΕ που ανήκει σε αυτή την ομάδα. Οι 
χώρες της ηπειρωτικής Ευρώπης έχουν μέση έως χαμη-
λή ανισότητα, ενώ η χαμηλότερη βρίσκεται στις Σκανδι-
ναβικές χώρες. Οι μόνες εξαιρέσεις σε αυτή ταξινόμηση 
είναι κάποιες χώρες της Ανατολικής Ευρώπης που ανή-
κουν στην ομάδα με την ελάχιστη ανισότητα διαθέσιμου 
εισοδήματος. Υποστηρίζεται ότι η καλύτερη εξήγηση για 
αυτή την κατάταξη και την ιστορική εξέλιξη των εθνικών 
ανισοτήτων διαθέσιμου εισοδήματος, είναι η διαφο-
ρετική εθνική δημόσια πολιτική, δηλαδή, οι δημόσιες 
αναδιανεμητικές πολιτικές, τα διαφορετικά φορολογικά 
συστήματα και οι εισφορές κοινωνικής ασφάλισης, που 
απορρέει από την πολιτική ιδεολογία του κυβερνώντος 
κόμματος, τη συνολική αποτελεσματικότητα και τη γεν-
ναιοδωρία των αναδιανεμητικών πολιτικών.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Eισοδηματικές ανισότητες, 
Ευρώπη, ΗΠΑ, κόμματα, ιδεολογία, αναδιανομή
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the levels, trends and causes 
of income inequality in Europe and the US. On 
the one hand, it finds that although market 
income inequality has generally risen, it did so 
more in some countries and less in others. On 
the other hand, disposable income inequality 
has had a puzzling irregular development. The 
latter is higher in the US, whereas in Europe 
three clusters of countries exist: Mediterranean 
and Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries have the highest disposable income 
inequality –with the UK being the only rich EU 
country belonging to this group. Continental 
Europe has medium to low inequality while the 
lowest is found in the Scandinavian ones. The 
only exceptions to this ranking are some of the 
CEEs who belong to the group with the lowest 
disposable income inequality. It is argued that 
the best explanation for this classification and the 
national disposable income inequalities’ history 
is the different national public policy, that is, 
national redistributive policies, different taxation 
systems and social security contributions, which 
stems from the political ideology of the ruling 
party, the overall effectiveness and generosity of 
redistributive policies.
KEY WORDS: Income inequalities, Europe, USA, 
political parties, ideology, redistribution
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Introduction1 
I ncome inequality is a characteristic of all countries throughout the history. Big gaps in pay resulting in a coexistence of extreme wealth and poverty,2 not only within a country but also 
between countries, create an unequal world where the feeling of injustice becomes prevalent. 
Unsurprisingly, after the beginning of the ‘credit crunch’, that is, the global financial turmoil and 
the subsequent recession, the issues of poverty and inequality are increasingly becoming a matter 
of public debate and concern. Especially in the western world (US and EU) there is a growing fear 
that globalisation increases inequality, primarily through the relocation of economic activity to 
countries with cheaper labour costs, leading to unemployment and poverty. 
The first part of this paper, briefly discusses some conceptual and methodological issues on 
defining and measuring income inequality. The second critically assesses the popular explanations 
of inequality. Finally, the third discusses the available empirical evidence regarding income 
inequality in Europe and proposes that disposable income inequality levels are related to public 
policy choices of national governments in public policy (namely public transfers, taxes and social 
security contributions), which stem from the political ideology of the ruling party. 
1. Multiple and different ‘inequalities’: varying definitions 
and measurement 
T he study of inequality faces significant challenges due to the controversial nature of the relevant literature. First, inequality is a multi-faceted notion which refers not only to differences in 
income but also in education, attainment, health, opportunities, capabilities (Sen, 1992), access to 
advantage (Cohen, 1993) and wellbeing (Callinicos, 2000). For many of these aspects of inequality, 
measurement is quite difficult, if not impossible (i.e. equality of capabilities or opportunities). 
Second, and more importantly, studies of inequality use different definitions of inequality, and 
concepts of wellbeing. Third, the reference unit varies significantly in the literature as it may 
be the individual income earner, the tax unit, the related or extended family or the household. 
The latter is also multi-defined in different databases and studies.3 Fourth, there is a conceptual 
disagreement on which type of inequality should one examine: some studies examine market 
income inequality (income from earnings, self employment, capital and private transfers) while 
others disposable income inequality (the available income after taxes and transfers).4 Another 
significant controversy, furthermore, lies on the data, and method of collection: some studies use 
national sources (national tax records, statistics, surveys etc) while others rely on international 
data bases such as the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS),5 the OECD, and the Eurostat. Both 
approaches have advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, national sources provide richer 
evidence for longer periods. However, the data cannot be used for cross-country comparisons, 
due to significant differences in data collection, concepts and measurements. On the other hand, 
international sources provide evidence that is compiled by the same method, the same definitions 
and measurements, making comparison possible and meaningful. Nonetheless, the data goes back 
only a few decades, making the study of long term trends impossible. 
From the aforementioned, it is clear that reaching widely accepted conclusions is difficult. 
Rather, a set of methodological choices have to be made that will not be accepted by everyone 
involved in inequality studies. In this paper, in order to avoid conceptual and methodological 
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pitfalls, some of the most widely accepted and frequently employed definitions and data in 
measuring inequality are used. For income, this paper employs one of the most widely accepted 
concepts of “disposable cash income”.6 Inequality is measured with three of the most widely 
used indicators, that is, the Gini coefficient, the income at the bottom and top 10th percentiles, 
also known as decile ratio (90/10),7 and the interquintile ratio (S80/S20).8 The reference unit for 
all data is the household.9 Finally, none of the data, figures and estimates includes benefits in 
kind or indirect taxes. 
2. Existing explanations: merits and shortcomings
T he most prominent10 explanation for current levels of inequality is that there has been a shift in demand away from unskilled towards skilled labour. This is associated with increased 
competition from newly industrialising countries as a result of globalisation, technical change 
biased towards skilled labour, or because both of these factors operate in conjunction. The reduced 
demand for less skilled labour means that, with relative supplies of the two kinds of worker fixed 
in the short run, in a free labour market there will be a rise in the premium for skilled workers 
and a decline in the relative wage of unskilled workers (Atkinson, 2003: 494). Advocates of this 
hypothesis claim that it explains not only the rising wage dispersion in the US but also the higher 
unemployment in Europe. This hypothesis has received extended criticism for its assumptions, 
and it is regarded by some as an oversimplification (ibid: 495). In a nutshell, critics claim that this 
hypothesis holds only if we assume two parallel universes with two trading regions (in one case the 
US and NIC, and in the other Europe and NIC); it does not hold when we examine simultaneously 
the three trading unions because in each possible scenario only one rich region is affected in terms 
of wage and trade levels.11
Moreover, both parts of this textbook hypothesis are problematic even when examined 
separately. First, the Skill-biased Technical Change hypothesis is time inconsistent as it cannot 
explain why the sharp rise in investment in information technology in the 1990s was not 
accompanied by a higher rate of increase in wage inequality – in fact inequality grew faster in 
the early 1980s. Second, it is almost falsified if applied to the inequality levels between the wages 
of workers in the middle of the distribution, as they have grown more slowly than the wages of 
workers at the lower end of the distribution, even though, of the two groups, workers in the 
middle of the distribution are typically the better educated (Autor, et al., 2006; Autor, et al., 2003; 
Gordon and Becker, 2007). 
The second part of the textbook explanation is the globalisation hypothesis. Under the 
heading of globalisation a number of variables are grouped. The first is immigration: increased 
immigration – especially of low-skilled people - means that labour markets have a surplus of 
workers at the bottom of the distribution. This increases inequality for two main reasons. On 
the one hand, it leads to an increase in the relative size of the low-wage work force (Lerman, 
1999). On the other hand, it enhances competition between low-skilled workers - not only 
between immigrants and native born (Borjas, 2003; 2006; Borjas and Katz, 2005) but also 
between immigrants themselves as the flow of new workers continues (Ottaviano and Peri, 
2006). Nevertheless, most of these studies are based on insufficient data and can explain only a 
very small percent of inequality.12 What is more, according to the US CPS data, the unskilled did 
better in the 1990s than in the 1980s, although the percentage of foreign-born workers doubled 
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in the 1990s, and the CPS 50–10 ratio for all workers declined slightly from1984 to 2004 despite 
the increased wave of immigration (Mishel et al., 2006). 
The second variable under the globalisation hypothesis is international trade, which, on the 
one hand, has reduced the profitability and hence the demand for labour in a number of industries 
that employed relatively more low-skilled workers (Borjas et al., 1997; Sachs and Shatz, 1994, 
and on the other hand, has increased the potential markets for other domestic industries, leading 
to higher demand and thus higher real wages for workers in those industries. Further, trade has 
diverted investment from domestic facilities to foreign direct investment through the outsourcing 
abroad of a number of activities - especially low-skilled manufacturing jobs - leading to lower 
salaries in the remaining companies and thus increasing market income inequality (Bernanke, 
2007). Again, empirical studies challenge this argument, arguing that trade-induced job losses 
and trade in general had only a marginal effect on the US income distribution (Mishel et al., 
2006). Finally, if globalisation was indeed the source of more or less inequality around the world, 
this would imply common patterns of inequality over time and within countries. However, the 
opposite is true, since there are very few common inequality trends and levels while the ranking of 
the countries in terms of their inequality situation remains the same.
A related explanation for the rise of US inequality is the Great Compression (Goldin and 
Margo, 1992). This hypothesis claims that inequality patterns are explained by three covariant 
factors: the role of the trade unions, trade and immigration. In short, the Great Compression 
thesis argues that income inequality remained low during 1940-1970 due to the high degree of 
unionisation accompanied with decline in trade and immigration. However, as shown above, the 
last two variables seem not to have an extensive impact on inequality. Moreover, the significance 
of the unions is debatable as empirical evidence13 shows that the decline of unionisation can 
explain only a tiny part of inequality trends – mainly for male workers. 
In addition, scholars studying US inequality have suggested that levels of income inequality 
are related to the level of the minimum wage.14 Empirical evidence confirms this, not only for the 
entire labour force, but especially for women (Mishel et al., 2006). However, the real value of the 
minimum wage and the proportion of the labour force that is unionised has been fairly flat in US 
the recent years which suggests that these institutional factors have been less important sources of 
increasing wage inequality recently than they were in the 1970s and 1980s (Bernanke, 2007).
Contrary to the aforementioned, many scholars examine not the bottom but the very top end 
of the distribution.15 The main focus is on the pay of CEOs, which rose significantly during the last 
decades, and on the rise of “superstars”, that is, a small number of the most gifted singers, actors, 
celebrities and athletes (Rosen, 1981). Recent examples are the TV host Oprah Winfrey ($275m per 
year), George Lucas ($170m per year), Steven Spielberg ($150m per year) and Madonna along golf 
player Tiger Woods both earning $110m per year (Miller et al., 2009). There is a fierce debate as to 
why the CEOs’ pay rise occurred, but it is definitely a reason for the increase in income inequality. 
For “superstars”, there seems to be a consensus behind the SBTC and globalisation explanations. 
In this view, superstars have enormously benefited from recent technological innovations (cable 
and satellite TV, internet, downloadable music, videos and DVDs) and globalisation, because they 
can reach a global audience with the same effort as before. 
These theories, however, neglect public policies’ role and as they assume them to be constant. 
In one of the most thorough studies of top incomes, it is argued that, contrary to Kuznets’s 
U-shape explanation of declining inequality during the first half of the 20th century, inequality 
declined because capital owners incurred severe shocks to their capital holding during the 1914 
to 1945 period because of the two world wars and the Great Depression (Atkinson and Piketty, 
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2007: 10). As regards to the non-recovery of top capital incomes during the post-1945 period, 
the authors suggest that the previous capital shocks had a permanent impact because of the 
introduction of high income and estate tax progressivity.16 Indeed, there is a significant long-run 
impact of tax progressivity on wealth concentration – significant enough to explain the magnitude 
of the observed changes (Piketty, 2003; 2007). 
In all countries, furthermore, top-income inequality declined for the most part during the 
period from1914 to 1945, and according to the authors most of the decline seems to be due to 
the fall in top capital incomes. The different trends in top-income inequality levels across countries 
support Atkinson and Piketty’s capital shock and progressive taxation explanation: the 1914 to 
1945 drop was larger in countries that were strongly hit by the war (e.g. France and Germany) than 
in the US, while there was no drop at all in countries relatively immune to the war’s impact (e.g. 
Switzerland). Moreover, wealth concentration seems to have better recovered during the post-war 
period in countries with less tax progressivity (especially estate tax) such as Germany. Although 
every country has its own particularities, there is an important distinction to be made between rich 
countries for the post-1970 period. On the one hand, the Anglo-Saxon block17 where there was a 
sudden rise in top wages and top income shares – with the US being the outlier with an enormous 
increase.18 On the other hand, in the continental European countries19 top income shares remained 
fairly stable (ibid, 2007: 11-12). However, one should not exaggerate the importance of capital 
income on the overall patterns of inequality. Albeit important for top incomes, for the mass of the 
population the single most important element is market and disposable income (Atkinson, 2007: 
10). This is the focus of the following section. 
3. The facts of income inequality in Europe and the US
I n this section income inequality levels in Europe and the US are discussed. Two crucial aspects of income are examined - market income and disposable income - in order to examine the 
impact of public policy on inequality levels, whereas both faces of inequality are studied: the 
snapshot image for the most recent year available, and its ‘history’ over the last century with 
a particular focus on the period since the 1960s. For market income and disposable income 
inequalities we use only the LIS database and measurements because it is the only available 
source which provides consistent data for many countries. For the snapshot image we use also the 
Eurostat Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions database20 because it provides data for 
a much more recent year of reference (2007) compared to the LIS (2000 for most countries). For 
the trends, the analysis is based on data and secondary evidence (such as studies and reports) that 
use national sources. Hence, inequality trends are not directly comparable across countries. The 
evidence presented below challenges the dominant and popular explanations of inequality such 
as globalisation, information and communication technologies or skill-biased technical change, 
since inequality trends are consistent with each country’s public policy which is determined by 
the partisan choices of national governments. In other words, it will be argued that current 
levels of disposable income inequality are not related primarily with some external or internal 
socio-economic factors, but with the national public policies’ efficiency, goals and orientation. In 
countries where national governments aimed at designing public policy in order to reduce income 
inequality and successfully implemented their policies, disposable income inequality is low; on the 
contrary, in countries where either national governments did not promote redistributive policies, 
and/or they were unable to implement such policies inequality is high. 
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3.1. Cross-national differences in disposable income inequality
According to the EU-SILC database for 2007, the most unequal country in the EU is Romania 
and the least unequal Slovenia. Overall, this ‘static’ picture paints a rather clustered image in 
regard to Europe’s income inequality: at the top end we find the latest EU entrants (Romania and 
Bulgaria), the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), and the big four South European 
Countries (SECs) (Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy); around or just below the EU-27 average we 
find the Continental European countries (CEEs) whereas at the bottom end of the inequality ladder 
we find the Scandinavian countries and most of the Central and Eastern European countries. Of 
course, as in any clustering effort, there are some exceptions: Cyprus and Malta are grouped along 
with the Continental European countries; Poland and Germany have higher inequality than their 
geographical ‘group’; finally, the UK is a ‘double outlier’: first, the UK interquintile ratio is much 
higher than the Irish one, which places Ireland among the Continental countries; second, the UK 
is the only rich EU country with a higher than average 80/20 ratio even though Germany is rapidly 
approaching similar levels of income inequality. 
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Inequality of income distribution 
Income quintile share ratio 
GRAPH 1: Income Inequality in descending order for 2007; reproduced from the EU-SILC database.
Even though the EU-SILC database provides the most recent snapshot image regarding 
disposable income inequality it cannot be used for the study of trends because on the one 
hand, the data is available only for the last decade but also because there are many ‘breaks’ or 
inconsistencies throughout the years and countries. In addition, the EU-SILC database does not 
include data for non-European industrialised (OECD) countries such as Japan and USA. For these 
reasons the LIS database is also used because it provides a wider snapshot image since it includes 
the aforementioned non-EU countries. Moreover, the LIS is used also for Europe as it includes data 
which have been calculated with the same methodology for the countries included. Finally, the 
LIS provides information on two types of inequality: market income inequality (income inequality 
before public transfers, taxation, etc.) and disposable income inequality (inequality after taxation 
and public transfers). Nevertheless, the main caveat of LIS is that most recent year of reference is 
not the same for all countries making direct comparison difficult. 
According to the LIS data, the US is an outlier among rich nations with a decile (90/10) 
ratio of disposable income inequality of 5.7 and a Gini coefficient of 37%. Moreover, while a 
low-income American in the 10th percentile has an income that is only 37% of the median 
income (P10), in most northern, central and eastern European countries the income of the poor 
exceeds 50% of the income of a middle-income person. However, not all European countries are 
above 50%: the UK, Ireland and the SECs are below the 50% threshold but above 40%. Likewise, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the UK are similar to the US with regard to the distance of the 
top from the median income: those in the 90th percentile earn more than twice the national 
median incomes (P90) (Brandolini and Smeeding, 2007: 5). Overall, with some exceptions, the 
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EU-SILC clustering is more or less reproduced in the LIS data: after the US, the SECs, the UK, and 
a Baltic country are at the top of the inequality ladder, the Continentals are in the middle and 
the Scandinavians at the bottom end with the lowest disposable income inequality. The CEEs 
are distributed around the middle and low end with the same ranking for Poland (higher than 
the rest), and Slovakia (among the Scandinavians). 
Table 3: The distribution of equivalent disposable income21 in Europe and the 
US; countries are ranked by their values in the Gini coefficient
Counties P10
(Low income)
P90
(High income)
P90/P1022
(Decile ratio)
Gini index
(percent)
USA 2000 37 212 5,7 37
Estonia 2000 46 234 5,1 36,1
UK 1999 47 215 4,6 34,3
Spain 2000 44 209 4,8 34
Greece 2000 43 207 4,8 33,8
Italy 2000 45 199 4,5 33,3
Ireland 2000 41 189 4,6 32,3
Hungary 1999 54 194 3,6 29,5
Poland 1999 52 188 3,6 29,3
Switzerland 2000 55 182 3,3 28
France 2000 55 188 3,4 27,8
Belgium 2000 53 174 3,3 27,7
Romania 1997 53 180 3,4 27,7
Germany 2000 54 180 3,4 27,5
Austria 2000 55 173 3,2 26
Luxembourg 2000 57 184 3,2 26
Czech Republic 1996 59 179 3 25,9
Sweden 2000 57 168 3 25,2
Norway 2000 57 159 2,8 25,1
Slovenia 1999 53 167 3,2 24,9
Netherlands 1999 56 167 3 24,8
Finland 2000 57 164 2,9 24,7
Slovakia 1996 56 162 2,9 24,1
Denmark 2000 57 155 2,8 22,5
SOURCE: Brandolini’s and Smeeding’s, 2007 calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study 
database, as of 10 March 2007. 
In order to examine the impact of the national public policy on disposable income inequality 
we will examine the market income inequality and compare it with the disposable income 
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inequality. In this way the role and the importance of public intervention will become evident. A 
common measure of the level of redistribution is represented by the difference between the Gini 
indices for market incomes, that is, before public transfers are added, taxes and social security 
contributions are deducted, and the Gini index for disposable incomes.23 Table 4 uses the LIS data 
to compare inequality in market and disposable incomes in 16 nations using the Gini coefficient. 
Table 4: Gini indices of market income and disposable income24 in Europe 
and the US (percent); countries are ranked by their values in the reduction 
in Gini index column 
Country Gini index(market income)
Gini index
(disposable income)
Reduction in
Gini index25
Denmark 2000 42 23 47
Sweden 2000 46 25 45
Germany 2000 48 28 43
Czech R. 1995 44 26 41
Poland 1999 50 29 41
Norway 2000 41 25 39
Finland 2000 38 25 36
Netherlands 1999 39 25 36
U.K. 1999 52 35 33
Romania 1997 36 28 27
Switzerland 2000 35 28 22
US 2000 48 37 23
Source: Brandolini’s and Smeeding, 2007.
The results are quite startling and it is argued that they reveal a very strong role for public policy 
in defining disposable income inequality. First, in all countries disposable incomes are more equally 
distributed than market incomes, suggesting that the tax and benefit system narrows the overall 
distribution (Brandolini and Smeeding 2007: 11-12). On average, inequality falls by about a third, 
from a Gini index of 44% to one of 29%. Cross-country variation in original inequality is wider than 
after redistribution: the Gini index ranges from 33% to 52% for market incomes, and from 23% to 
37% for disposable incomes. The US has the highest inequality of disposable incomes, but although 
the dispersion of market incomes is on the high side it is not far from most other countries.
Second, “these percentage reductions are very consistent with the patterns of aggregate 
public expenditure” (ibid; see also Smeeding, 2005 on non-elderly spending). High-spending 
northern and central European nations have the highest degree of inequality reduction, from 47% 
to 36%; the UK and Ireland are in the middle, whereas the US and Switzerland are at the bottom 
of the scale. The degree of redistribution in SECs is lower than in Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
especially if public pensions are not included among transfers (Immervoll et al., 2005). However, 
it does not change significantly even when the role of public pensions is included; as Lefébvre, 
2007 has calculated the Mediterranean countries and Ireland obtained the worst results in terms 
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of poverty alleviation and inequality reduction due to public pension transfers with UK the only 
rich EU country belonging to the smallest effect on poverty alleviation. 
Third, disposable income inequality is not the result of market income inequality or even 
affected by it. Contrary to the critique that countries may have low disposable income inequality 
because their pre-public policy market income inequality is also low, the degree of redistribution 
across countries is not related with the degree of market income inequality.26 Surprisingly, when 
comparing the Gini index of market and disposable income inequality we see that countries with 
some of the highest rates of market income inequality, such as the UK, Poland and the Scandinavian 
countries end up having lower levels of disposable income inequality than the US. 
The aforementioned, can be summarized as follows. First, disposable income inequality is 
not a mirror image of market income inequality; countries with higher market income inequality 
reduce disposable income inequality to a greater extent than other countries with lower market 
income inequality. Second, the US has higher disposable income inequality than the European 
average, whereas in Europe three clusters of countries exist: SECs, the Baltics and some of the 
CEE countries have the highest disposable income inequality –with the UK being the only rich 
EU country belonging to this group. Continental Europe has medium to low inequality while the 
lowest is found in the Scandinavian ones. The only exceptions to this ranking are some of the CEEs 
who belong to the group with the lowest inequality. 
This clustering of nations is analogous to the classification of welfare states and overall social 
and public policy (for a review on the welfare typology see Sapir 2006; Arts and Gelissen, 2002): 
countries with weak and inefficient welfare states (SECs, Baltics) or countries with low degree of 
redistributive public policies (USA, the UK,) are on the top of the disposable income inequality 
rankings; countries with strong and efficient welfare states and highly redistributive taxation 
systems (Scandinavians) are at the bottom end whereas countries with average welfare protection 
and redistributive taxation (Continentals) in middle. The only exceptions to this rule are some the 
CEECs where despite their weak welfare states and their non-redistributive taxation, show very low 
disposable income inequality levels. These exceptions invite further research and indeed should be 
examined in detail in order to highlight the reasons behind their deviant inequality ratios. 
3.2. Inequality’s history: Episodes of change 
Studying the “history” of inequality27 is also crucial to understanding the causes behind its current 
levels and the reasons for any upward or downward trend in the past. In this section, inequality 
levels during the last century are examined focusing on the US and to a selection of European 
countries, due to the restrictions in data availability for other countries/regions. It is argued that, 
despite the methodological and empirical restrictions, instead of inequality trends there are 
“episodes of change” which divide different time periods of inequality patterns. Contrary to the 
dominant explanations of income inequality (discussed in section 2), furthermore, it will be argued 
that these episodes are not related with some external or internal economic/societal factors, but 
with changes in government and, in particular, with governments’ partisan choices. In particular, 
it is argued that left wing or centre left governments either kept stable or decreased disposable 
income inequality whereas right wing or centre-right increased it. 
The main source of data in this endeavour is national household surveys. This choice offers 
both drawbacks and benefits: on the one hand, direct comparisons are treacherous and rather 
impossible since different countries use different definitions, measurements and units of analysis; 
on the other hand, the main advantage is that we can go back in time much easier than any 
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international databases. Indeed, national databases provide the best source of information for the 
study of the history of inequality, since the only international comparison is made by the OECD 
(2005) with data up to 1975. However, these data can be comparable only after 1985. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, the OECD does not reach definite conclusions on the historical development of income 
inequality. In particular, the OECD distinguishes three inequality periods in Europe. From 1975 
to 1985 there is little comparable evidence, and its members show mixed results;28 from 1985 to 
1995 there is a clear trend of increased inequality only for some countries;29 these trends continued 
in the following period (1995 to 2000).30 Nevertheless, inequality remained broadly stable in some 
countries31 while it continued to increase in others.32 The OECD reaches an interesting conclusion: 
the overall pattern has not changed dramatically: low inequality in the Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands, medium to Continental and higher inequality in the Anglo-Saxon and the southern 
European countries (Pestieau, 2006: 15).
During the last few decades, contrary to the period between the 1950s and the early 1970s, 
disposable income inequality in the rich countries rose. This trend has been characterised as the 
“great U-turn” (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988) – a conclusion that turns around the classic and 
famous “inverse U-turn” thesis or “Kuznets curve”.33 The argument is that this reversal occurred not 
only in the US34 but also internationally in a number of countries.35 In contrast, a number of scholars 
argue that there has been little distributional change within countries over time (see among others 
Gustaffson and Johansson, 1999; Melchior et al., 2000). The reasons for this disagreement are in 
sum the problems already highlighted in the field of inequality: dissimilar data, broken series, 
different definitions, etc. In addition, comparisons between different countries may be impossible 
(how meaningful is it to compare the US with, for instance, the Netherlands, in order to examine 
whether there is a U-turn or not?). Hence, the best option for examining the inequality history is 
to go country by country. In the following, empirical evidence regarding the ‘history’ of inequality 
is going to be discussed, arguing that there has been no stable trend in inequality levels: neither a 
U or reverse U turn, nor a constant process of increasing/decreasing inequality. 
Starting with the US, evidence supports the U-turn hypothesis (Brandolini and Smeeding, 
2007). However, Atkinson (2003) concludes that it is not possible to verify the U-turn hypothesis 
since inequality fell only during 1961 to 1968. Before this period there is no trend, and the break 
in the CPS series in 1993 makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions. Likewise, in a more recent 
study, he finds that in the period 1929-1944, the available data is not sufficient enough since it 
is covered only by a small number of data points (Atkinson, 2007: 6). However, when examining 
European trends of disposable income inequality per household, we find that some countries 
provide support to the U-turn hypothesis, namely the UK and the Scandinavian countries. 
What is more, even if some countries support the U-turn thesis, it is for different reasons than 
originally argued. In the following, I argue that it was public policies and governmental political 
decisions that determined the history of inequality in most European countries than a structural 
transformation of their economies. 
In particular, Swedish levels of inequality decreased significantly during 1967-1982 –much 
more dramatically during 1967-1975 and more moderately afterwards. After 1982, however, 
an upward trend began which continued up to the 1990s.36 Nonetheless, it wasn’t an internal 
structural reason as the U-turn or inverse U-turn scholars would argue neither an external one 
(globalization, trade, etc). Rather, for the period 1967 to 1975, both transfers and direct taxes 
contributed to the decrease in inequality in the first period, with the former the major factor 
(Gustafsson and Palmer, 1997). Likewise, inequality rose in 1980s due to tax reforms, and 
increased capital gains in the 1990s. Overall, the Scandinavian countries provide some evidence 
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of “the great U-turn” thesis even though for the downward trend data is scarce and for the 
upward trend it is concentrated mainly in the 1990s. 
The UK shows one of the most puzzling cases. Until the 1960s, similarly to the US, there 
is little overall change in inequality levels. In the 1970s, unlike the US, inequality is reduced 
by 3 percentage points. This fall is radically reversed in the 1980s with a great rise of the Gini 
coefficient37 (Atkinson, 2003: 487). None of the existing theories (see next section) can explain 
why the UK was twice as severely affected as the US.38 The second feature is that the 1990s do not 
show a continuing upward trend: the 2000 Gini coefficient is the same as that for 1990 whereas 
the one of 2005 below the 1990 Gini. So, contrary to the U-turn hypothesis, we have an episode 
of rising inequality in the 1980s, not a continuing upward trend. In other words, income inequality 
in the UK almost doubled compared to the US during the 1984 to 1990 period, showing a rather 
episodic rise; thereafter, contrary to the US, it remained stable or decreased. Hence, it seems 
rather problematic to indicate a common external process as the cause of these puzzling and 
contradictory inequality patterns. The best explanation for the UK trend is respective governments’ 
public policy and welfare reforms for each period. In particular, the 1980s was dominated by 
the Thatcher government which aimed to reduce welfare support and promoted reforms that 
decreased the re-distributional character of a number of public policies and taxation. In contrast, 
during the 1990s there was a change of government, with New Labour taking office in 1997 and 
aiming to reduce inequalities and to provide at least equality of opportunities.39
Contrary to the Nordic countries and the UK, continental Europe provides no support for a U 
or inverse U turn. For Germany, France and Italy inequality remained roughly stable –with France 
being the only country that showed no rise of income inequality at all. The most interesting case 
is the Netherlands which demonstrates a very similar trend to the UK: there was an episode of 
rising inequality in the 1980s which did not continue into the 1990s (Atkinson, 2003: 490). And 
as in UK, the 1980s were dominated by the rightwing and neo-liberal CDA40 -VVD41 governmental 
coalition which under the leadership of Ruud Lubbers implemented a program of radical reform of 
the welfare state. It should be noted that Lubbers who was the Dutch Prime Minister from 1982 
until 1994 had as one of his campaign slogans the call for ‘meer markt, minder overheid’, that is, 
more market and less government. Unsurprisingly he is regarded as an ideological heir to Margaret 
Thatcher and –as Baroness Thatcher did in the UK- his welfare state reforms led to a sharp increase 
of disposable income inequality. This rise ended in the 1990s when Lubbers had to share power 
with the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) which despite not altering the reforms and policies of the 
previous period did not proceed in further deregulation of the welfare state. 
Overall, in most countries disposable income inequality per household decreased during the 
1930s and 1940s, increased during the 1950s and 1960s, decreased after the early 1970s and 
increased after the mid-1980s. Hence, if disposable inequality started to rise in 1950 rather than 
1980, then the ICT explanation and the impact of globalisation become even weaker (Atkinson, 
2007: 13). In addition, despite the variations over time of inequality levels within countries, the 
comparative ranking of most countries has not changed. In other words, membership in one of 
the three categories of high, medium and low inequality is very consistent –a result that confirms 
OECD’s study. This finding poses some crucial constraints in the globalisation thesis or any other 
hypothesis that implies that inequality levels are determined by externally imposed variables 
that bypass the nation state. In the same vein, as it was analysed above, it is rather difficult to 
accept both the “inverse U” and the “great U” theses for the US and Europe. Thus, the most 
adequate explanation cannot be a common external or internal process such as globalisation or 
de-industrialisation; some countries experienced an increase in inequality while others did not.
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Is the history of disposable income inequality affected by the respective levels of market 
income inequality or by the national welfare and taxation policies? In section 3.1., we saw that 
it was the latter which determined disposable income inequality’s snapshot image. What about 
inequality over time? In the following, it is argued that the same applies for inequality’s ‘history’. 
To begin with, when comparing the absolute difference between the Gini index for market 
income and that for disposable income, it becomes evident that the trend in the redistributive 
impact of tax-and-transfer systems may vary considerably. However, there is a general pattern, 
suggesting that the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers initially increased and then stabilised 
or dropped in all countries except for the United States, where it remained quite stable over time 
(but the series starts only in 1979). The UK stands out for having the most dramatic switch of 
regime, as in the early 1980s it apparently shifted from a situation not too different from the two 
Nordic countries to a model closer to that of the US (Brandolini and Smeeding, 2007). In any case, 
a widening of the market income distribution need not result in a drastic increase in the inequality 
of disposable incomes. Rising levels of redistribution in Finland and Sweden, where policies have 
been increasingly targeted to the poor, have been more effective in muting increasing market 
income inequality than have stable but low levels of redistribution in the United States (ibid: 21-
22). Consequently, empirical evidence (sections 3.1. - snapshot image and 3.2. - inequality over 
time) clearly demonstrate that whatever the market income inequality, the inequality of disposable 
income is not affected by the market forces and the levels of market income inequality but by 
public policies, namely public transfers, taxes and social security contributions.
In this respect, the study of Brady and Leicht, 2007 regarding the relationship between income 
inequality and the ideology of the incumbent government is very illuminating. Using the LIS data, 
the authors examine the impact of right-wing party power on three measures of disposable income 
inequality for 16 affluent western democracies42 from 1969 to 2000. According to their findings, 
the cumulative effect of right-wing party power significantly increases inequality through three 
main mechanisms: legislative action, administrative office-holding and ideological influence. In 
addition, the authors find that left-wing party power has less influence than the right on the Gini 
coefficient and the 90/50 ratio, but a larger influence on the 90/10 ratio, whereas union density 
is insignificant after controlling for right-wing party power. Moreover, they find that right-wing 
parties became more influential after 1989, while left-wing parties became less effective. Finally, 
the authors argue that their results do not depend on the inclusion of the US in the sample.
To sum up, this section has shown that the ‘history’ of inequality is characterised by episodes 
of change than of any common or continuous trends. These episodes are defined by the changes 
in government at the national level and their partisan policies in national public policy with regard 
to the orientation, generosity and the overall redistributive nature of public transfers, taxes and 
social security contributions current inequality levels. 
4. Conclusions and discussion
T he evidence presented above challenges the dominant and popular explanations of inequality such as globalisation, information and communication technologies or skill-biased technical 
change, since inequality trends are consistent with each country’s political developments. In other 
words, inequality is not determined by any external or internal economic or societal processes but 
by the political actors’ choices in each country embodied in the content of public transfers, taxes 
and social security contributions. The more redistributive the taxation and public benefits system 
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is, the lower the levels of inequality. In other words, it is a matter of public policy, not of external 
or internal economic and societal processes that are beyond the control of policymakers. 
The aforementioned have significant implications for Greece -a country with the fifth highest 
disposable income inequality in the EU-27. The main problem for Greece seems to be the inefficiency 
of public policies: even though it spends 24.2% of GDP on social expenditure, which is quite close 
to the EU-27 average of 26.9%, it fails to reach the expected results in reducing inequality (and of 
course poverty). In addition, the tax and benefit systems have to be more selective and more means 
tested in order to achieve greater redistribution of income. Finally, the chronic problem of the 
unofficial economy and the unregistered workforce and incomes has to be eradicated. This paper 
has shown that whatever the global and domestic conditions, it is up to national policy makers to 
reduce disposable income inequality levels; they just have to choose to do so.
Notes
1. This paper draws extensively on Zartaloudis, 2007. However, this version is not only shorter 
but it has also been updated with the most recent data available. Thus, many of the evidence 
presented here are completely new. 
2. Alcock (1993: 255) argues that ‘poverty is the unacceptable face of inequality.’
3. Although total household income depends on the earnings of individual members, it is not 
possible to interpret directly from the distribution of individual earnings to the distribution of 
household incomes (Atkinson, 2007: 3). For a concise discussion of the methodological consid-
erations with regards to the reference unit and its impact on results, see Atkinson, 2003; 2007 
and Smeeding, 2007).
4. Another suggestion is to include in the calculation of income assets such as housing ownership 
(Orton and Rowlingson, 2007). 
5. The LIS database is the most important international data archive providing access to micro 
data. It includes household income surveys of 30 countries on four continents. These surveys 
provide income, demographic, labour market and expenditure information on three different 
levels: household, person and child. Its main advantage compared to other sources of data 
(especially from the OECD database) is that it is not drawn from national sources but uses a 
harmonised set of concepts, methodology and variables. Thus, the LIS database is one of the 
most reliable for international comparisons (see Smeeding, 2002; 2004; 2006).
6. The ‘disposable cash income’ concept is used not only by the Luxembourg Income Study, but 
also Eurostat, UNICEF and OECD have independently made comparisons of income poverty 
and inequality across nations using identical or very similar measures of net disposable income 
(Smeeding, 2007: 73). It includes all types of money income minus direct income and payroll 
taxes, and includes all cash and near-cash transfers such as food stamps and cash housing al-
lowances, as well as refundable tax credits such as the earned income tax credit in the United 
States. It excludes capital gains, imputed rents, other unrealised types of capital income, home 
production and in-kind income. These items may account for an important share of the eco-
nomic resources at a household’s disposal, and their inclusion in the income definition may 
affect measured inequality (Brandolini and Smeeding, 2007: 5). See Atkinson, Rainwater and 
Smeeding, 1995 and the Canberra Group, 2001 for more on this income definition and its 
robustness across nations.
7. The LIS uses the decile ratio.
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8. The interquintile ratio is the indicator used by Eurostat to evaluate the income inequality with-
in the European Union. Although, there is little difference between Gini indicators coming 
from the OECD and LIS, the quintile ratios are different between the LIS and Eurostat as they 
are higher in later estimates. However, Lefébvre, 2007 has calculated that the correlation coef-
ficient between both is high (0.739), which confirms that both give about the same ranking.
9. For international comparisons of poverty and inequality, the “household” is the only compa-
rable income-sharing unit available for almost all nations. While the household is the unit used 
for aggregating income, the person is the unit of analysis. Household income is assumed to be 
equally shared among individuals within a household (Smeeding and Munzi, 2005: 9).
10. Or the “textbook” explanation (Atkinson, 2003)
11. For a detailed explanation see Atkinson, 2003: 495).
12. For a detailed discussion of the literature on the impact of immigration on US inequality, see 
Gordon and Becker, 2007.
13. See Card et al., 2004; Mishel et al., 2006.
14. The hypothesis is that the erosion of the real minimum wage after the late 1970s accounts for 
much of the increase of the 90/10 inequality ratio.
15. For one of the most detailed studies regarding the historic development of the trends of the 
top-income distribution see Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; for a succinct discussion of the con-
temporary debate (superstars, CEOs), see, among others, Gordon and Becker, 2007: 16-25. 
16. The latter was almost non-existent prior to 1914, and as a result, top income rates increased 
massively during the period 1914 to 1945
17. Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the US.
18. The share of the top 1% doubled in the US (and the UK).
19. France, Germany and the Netherlands.
20. The EU-SILC provides cross-country comparable data for all EU-25 countries, as well as Norway 
and Iceland. However, this database exists only from 2005. Until 2001 (in certain cases, until 
2000), data is obtained from ECHP data source for EU-15 countries, except Denmark and Swe-
den. For the remaining countries and years, data is obtained from national sources which are 
not fully comparable with the EU-SILC. Trends in transition years cannot be interpreted reli-
ably. In order to measure inequality EU-SILC uses the S80/S20 ratio while income is understood 
‘as equivalised disposable income’.
21. Observations are bottom-coded at 1% of the mean of equivalent disposable income and top-
coded at 10-times the median of unadjusted disposable income. Incomes are adjusted for 
household size by the square-root equivalence scale.
22. P10 and P90 are the ratios to the median of the 10th and 90th percentiles, respectively.
23. This difference provides only a first estimate of the actual impact of public redistribution, as it 
ignores how market income inequality would be different if there were no taxes and benefits.
24. Observations for disposable income are bottom-coded at 1% of the mean of equivalent dispos-
able income and top-coded at 10-times the median of unadjusted disposable income. Changes 
in disposable incomes due to bottom- and top-coding are entirely attributed to market in-
comes. Both market and disposable incomes are adjusted for household size by the square-root 
equivalence scale. 
25. Difference between the Gini index for market income and the Gini index for disposable in-
come, are expressed as a percentage of the former.
26. Schwabish et al., 2006 find almost no correlation between the P10 value for market income 
and the level of social spending.
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27. As in the previous section, we focus on disposable income inequality and the unit of analysis is 
the household.
28. There is a decline in Greece, Finland and Sweden, and an increase in the Netherlands and the 
UK
29. Austria, Denmark, Greece, the UK, Finland and Sweden – only France and Ireland demonstrate 
a slight decrease.
30. With the main difference that the Netherlands joins France and Ireland in the decreasing 
camp.
31. Germany, Italy and Portugal. 
32. Austria, Denmark, Greece and the UK, with a much more significant rise in Sweden and Fin-
land.
33. According to Kuznets curve, as an economy goes through a structural transformation, income 
inequality follows an inverse U-shape, inequality first rising and then falling as labour is trans-
ferred from low-productivity agriculture into high-productivity industry. 
34. See Alderson and Nielsen, 2002.
35. See Cornia and Court, 2001.
36. It should be stressed that there is a significant problem of data comparability (Atkinson, 2003: 
488).
37. From 1984 to 1990: the Gini coefficient in the UK rose by more than one percentage point a 
year. Overall, there was an increase in the Gini coefficient of 10 percentage points. Even if part 
of the rise was reversing the fall in the 1970s, the 1990 figure was 6.7 points higher than the 
highest value recorded in the 1960s.
38. For Atkinson (2003) any theory must be able to explain this trend.
39. For a further analysis of New Labour’s positions on inequality, see Orton and Rowlingson, 
2007.
40. The Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) is a Christian-democratic political formation composed 
of KVP (Catholic People’s Party), CHU (Christian Historical Union) and ARP (Anti Revolutionary 
Party).
41. The People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) is the most liberal party in the Nether-
lands and even though originally was a supporter –at least in principle- of the welfare state, 
after 1971 became more sceptical towards the welfare state, advocating reform of the welfare 
state and lower taxes in order to increase economic growth. In other words, from a liberal party 
it became a neo-liberal one (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002: 49). 
42. The countries were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
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